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Ðề tài: Xung đột Thái Lan-Việt Nam 1982-1988

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    Smile Xung đột Thái Lan-Việt Nam 1982-1988

    Có ai biết về trận này không vậy, wiki viết sơ xài quá

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    Papa làm trinh sát bên đấy, kể rằng lính VN được phát mỗi người 1 quả lựu đạn tự sát cỡ trứng gà ta, rút chốt là nổ ngay! Mấy lần cụ lộ vị trí, bị nó rượt với bắn quá trời, đã phải sờ vào rồi( may quá)

    Lính Thái bắn như ku*t, đấu súng với bộ đội mình toàn thua, được cái chạy nhanh với lúc nào cũng la hét om sòm!
    Ta và thần dân của ta đã đi tới một thỏa hiệp khiến cả đôi bên đều hài lòng. Họ thích nói gì thì nói và ta thích làm gì thì làm.
    Friedrich II

    Nghệ thuật cai trị là việc khiến hai phần ba của một quốc gia trả tất cả những gì mình có thể trả vì lợi ích của một phần ba còn lại.
    Voltaire

  3. #3
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    Tớ cũng chỉ biết mang máng là sau khi giải phóng cái đền mà giờ Cam với Thái đang tranh chấp thì Tàu đề nghị Thái cho mượn lãnh thổ để tàn binh Khmer Đỏ trú nhờ và tiện nhận viện trợ từ Tàu và Mĩ sang. Quân ta thấy thế bèn quét thẳng luôn vào lãnh thổ Thái, đánh tan 1 sư của nó rồi sau đấy rút vì ko có không quân yểm trợ mà nhà nó lôi máy bay ra.
    Hidden Content Từ bài viết của pretorian_269 Hidden Content
    Không nhất thiết là người trong một nước đánh nhau mới là nội chiến.
    nhầm rồi toàn bộ mấy cái trên la coppi cua bac huyphuc- .. hem phải của bãi rác wiwi
    Chúa thở dài đáp: “Ta buồn vì chân ta đã bị đóng đinh chặt vào cây thập giá, nếu không thì Ta đã đá vào đít nhà ngươi mấy cái rồi.”
    autoload thì khó gì, chẳng qua họ quan niệm người nạp đạn được huấn luyện tốt sẽ nhanh hơn máy và giúp bố trí đạn thuận tiện hơn
    Hidden Content Từ bài viết của Happyfeet Hidden Content
    Kh 59 là nó đề cập tới bản không đối đất anh à.

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    bố em bảo hồi đóng gần một cái đồn của Thái, thi thoảng thấy lính Thái mặc quần sooc đi lại thôi. Đọ súng lẻ tẻ thì hường xuyên, chứ ngoài vụ đánh tan 1 sư đoàn Thái thì hình như không đánh lớn nữa.
    ....Sông Ðằng một dải dài ghê

    Luồng to sóng lớn tuôn về bể Ðông

    Những người bất nghĩa tiêu vong

    Nghìn thu chỉ có anh hùng lưu danh....

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    Trích Từ bài viết của black_cat1 View Post
    Tớ cũng chỉ biết mang máng là sau khi giải phóng cái đền mà giờ Cam với Thái đang tranh chấp thì Tàu đề nghị Thái cho mượn lãnh thổ để tàn binh Khmer Đỏ trú nhờ và tiện nhận viện trợ từ Tàu và Mĩ sang. Quân ta thấy thế bèn quét thẳng luôn vào lãnh thổ Thái, đánh tan 1 sư của nó rồi sau đấy rút vì ko có không quân yểm trợ mà nhà nó lôi máy bay ra.
    Hình như cậu lộn rồi. Khu đất mà chính Pol Pot ở lẫn khu đóng quân của các quan chức Khmer Đỏ được LHQ thuê cho và đúng nằm trong biên giới Thái Lan. Vũ khí TQ chuyển đến cho Khmer qua đường Myanmar. Còn vũ khí CIA và các nước NATO chuyển từ Tây Âu- mua từ các công ty Tây Đức qua cảng Singapore vào Thái Lan rồi chuyển lên biên giới bằng đường bộ cho Polpot. Nên nhớ đến tận những năm 90s, chính quyền Khmer Đỏ vẫn được LHQ công nhận là chính quyền chính thức của dân Campuchia

    Mấy cái này coi phim tài liệu Cambodia: 10 năm có nhắc đến. Phim làm thời đó mà
    "Có một sai lầm cực lớn trong cả chính trị lẫn tôn giáo. Đó chính là trong khi cố gắng thuyết phục người khác bạn cũng đã vô tình thuyết phục bản thân."
    "Tôi thà quên đi quá khứ để nhìn rõ hiện tại, tương lai, còn hơn là mù quáng tương lai để cố níu kéo những thứ vốn đã không còn tồn tại"
    "Quen thuộc với lí thuyêt là cần thiết vì thực tế không thể tự diễn giải"
    Hidden Content

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    Ờ cái đoạn đó ko nhớ rõ lắm nhưng vì đám tàn quân Khmer Đỏ dùng lãnh thổ Thái làm căn cứ quấy phá nên quân ta mới đánh sang đấy.
    Hidden Content Từ bài viết của pretorian_269 Hidden Content
    Không nhất thiết là người trong một nước đánh nhau mới là nội chiến.
    nhầm rồi toàn bộ mấy cái trên la coppi cua bac huyphuc- .. hem phải của bãi rác wiwi
    Chúa thở dài đáp: “Ta buồn vì chân ta đã bị đóng đinh chặt vào cây thập giá, nếu không thì Ta đã đá vào đít nhà ngươi mấy cái rồi.”
    autoload thì khó gì, chẳng qua họ quan niệm người nạp đạn được huấn luyện tốt sẽ nhanh hơn máy và giúp bố trí đạn thuận tiện hơn
    Hidden Content Từ bài viết của Happyfeet Hidden Content
    Kh 59 là nó đề cập tới bản không đối đất anh à.

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    Trích Từ bài viết của tonoko View Post
    Có ai biết về trận này không vậy, wiki viết sơ xài quá
    Nhai đc tiếng Anh ko vậy????

    Underclared war with Thailand
    Already the Khmer Rouge left nothing untried to isolate Cambodia from the outside world, once the Thais started supporting the Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian armed groups, the new regime installed by the Vietnamese continued the politics of antagonizing its neighbours. The fighting between the Cambodians and the Thais was actually nothing new. As described above, the RTAF was flying combat operations in Cambodia already since 1966, and especially in the early 1970s. In July 1977, violent fighting between the Thai Army and the Khmer Rouge erupted in the Aranyaprathet area, and the RTAF F-5Es were called for CAS.

    Of course, the RTAF also used helicopters massively for support of ground forces in heavy terrain. In fact, it seems that the Thai reaction at the time was so violent, that it was one of the reasons why the Khmer Rouge turned against Vietnam instead: the Khmer were never able to establish permanent bases along the Thai border. The situation worsened after the Vietnamese invasion as a considerable number of Khmers escaped into Thailand and established new bases there, and then even more when the insurgency against the Vietnamese increased. To make matters worse the Vietnamese then started supporting a communist opposition in Thailand, that was soon to grew to force of some 10.000 fighters. For the following 20 years the RTAF therefore became engaged in a protracted anti-guerrilla campaign inside and outside its borders, the first serious incident occurring on 23 June 1980 when the Vietnamese attacked NKPLF bases in the Aranyaprathet area. In response the RTAF and the Thai Army hit back, but the Vietnamese shot down a helicopter and also a O-1 FAC.
    Meanwhile, by 1982 the situation in Cambodia was such that no Vietnamese supply convoy could be underway without a support of at least a single squad of T-55 tanks: namely, the Vietnamese troops had an insufficient number of M-113s and BTR-60s, and were suffering considerable losses in road ambushes. The Russians then started supplying increasing numbers of Mi-8s and Mi-24As, and the Vietnamese activated even a number of T-28Ds, left behind from the AVNK-times, but these were actually seldom used. The situation was not improving, however, and finally much more massive retaliation was needed: in 1981 there were rumours about the Vietnamese using a number of An-2s to spray chemical weapons on Khmer concentrations.

    By 1982 the SRVAF was sometimes operating near and even over the Thai border: especially the Vietnamese An-26 transports, equipped as ELINT/SIGINT-gatherers were used to track operations of the Thai Army and search for guerrilla bases and activity. One of these crashed inside Thailand in February 1982 under unknown circumstances. The loss is not known to have been brought in connection with activity of RTAF interceptors, even if these are known to have flown CAPs in the area, and several times even attempted to intercept Vietnamese reconnaissance aircraft: neither Hanoi nor Bangkok was interested in widening the war, and consequently such operations were undertaken very carefully by both sides.

    In April 1983 the Vietnamese attacked NKPLF bases in the Aranyaprathet area again, but meet a fierce resistance. On 4 April the first two RTAF F-5Es bombed the Vietnamese, and over the next few days additional strikes were flown before an A-37 was brought down by SA-7, on 8 of the month. In late March 1984, the Vietnamese launched an attack against the Khmer Rouge base in the Dongrek mountain range, opposite Sisaket province. When Vietnamese troops entered Thai territory, the Thai Army responded by shelling them and calling in A-37-strikes. The fighting continued into April and the RTAF increased its sortie rate forcing the Vietnamese to deploy anti-aircraft artillery units. On 14 April a Thai O-1 was brought down, followed the next day by an A-37B.

    A Vietnamese gunner seen in his position inside the cargo bay of a SVRAF C-130A Hercules transporter: note the US-made Mk.82 bombs on palets around him and the makeshift "periscope" and targeting systemenabling him to see the target, so to activate and drop the bombs in time. The SVRAF made extensive use of C-130s and An-26s equipped in this way for attacks against guerrilla strongholds in the 1980s. (A. Grandolini collection)

    A fully bombed-up RTAF A-37B from the 211 Squadron/21st Wing seen at Ubon in the 1980s. The Dragonflies were engaged extensively against the Vietnamese troops that made forays into Thai territory. (Albert Grandolini collection)

    In November 1984 the Vietnamese concentrated a force of 75.000 troops for a large operation against the ANS and the Khmer Rouge along the Thai border. Not much was reported about this offensive, but it is known that by January 1985 the fighting spilled over the border into Thailand, in the Ampil area. The Vietnamese used plenty of artillery and tanks forcing the Thais to react. The RTAF was again called and A-37s flew a number of strike sorties. This time, however, the Vietnamese had their air defences ready, and also a number of Soviet MiG-23MLDs deployed at Cam Ranh Bay AB, and the last were seen flying CAPs along the Thai border. In fact, there were several unconfirmed reports about engagements between RTAF F-5Es and Soviet MiGs, as well as Vietnamese helicopters, but it seems these were all spread by the government in Bang Kong with the target of compelling Washington to supply more modern F-16 fighters. The RTAF was seriously concerned about the possibility that Vietnam would acquire some MiG-23s. Eventually, in March 1985, the USA finally agreed to sell eight F-16As and four F-16Bs, worth $318 million. This represented a substantial part of the RTAF budget at the time and the air force was therefore forced to cut back on other projects. For example, the acquisition of additional C-130s was postponed.

    The fear of Soviet MiG-23MLD or an eventual acquisition of Floggers by the Vietnamese Air Force prompted the RTAF to purchase eight F-16As and four F-16Bs in March 1985. They re-equiped the 103rd Squadron/1st Wing at Korat AB. (General Dynamics via Albert Grandolini)

    In fact, the only direct Soviet involvement in Cambodia was in the area of tactical transport operations. Shortly after the fall of Phnom Penh, in January 1979, Soviet Il-76s and An12s – all wearing the Aeot colours – were noticed flying in badly needed humanitarian relief. The same transports, however, were noticed off-loading equipment for the Vietnamese Army. When China invaded northern Vietnam, in February 1979, the Soviet transports were also used to move four Vietnamese divisions (10th, 304th, 320th, and 325th) from Cambodia to the Hanoi area. The Soviets maintained a detachment of An-12s in Cambodia between 1980 and 1982, which was then replaced by a number of SRVAF An-26s. These, however, had also to be flown by Soviet pilots, because the Vietnamese lacked qualified crews for them. This practice was to be continued through the rest of the 1980s.

    Back to the Vietnamese offensive against the Khmer Rouge: by January 1985, the fighting spilled over the border around Ampil. The Vietnamese used artillery and tanks, forcing the Thai to react. The Thai Army called in RTAF for support and soon A-37s were flying bombing missions. The Vietnamese were prepared for this, and on 8 January, they brought down an A-37B with a SA-7. The RTAF continued to fly attack sorties with A-37s and F-5s until the Vietnamese withdrew a few days later. When the Vietnamese offensive was concluded, in March 1985, it was declared for “another success” by Hanoi. In fact, the Khmer were weakened, but not wiped out. Ever since, the Vietnamese altered their tactics: realized the pointlessness of expending immense efforts in skirmishes with the evasive guerrilla, the Vietnamese concentrated on winning the hearts and minds of the Cambodian population, while attempting to conserve their resources. On the other side, the guerrilla had their own problems as well: most of the KPNLF leaders were US-trained members of the former Cambodian Army, the training and previous experience of which made it difficult for them to adapt to the changing requirements of the guerrilla war. The Khmer had it easier, benefiting from their earlier experiences; the ANS, on the contrary, came out pretty badly shot-up from the campaign in 1984-1985, and subsequently attempted to avoid unnecessary confrontations, instead concentrating on penetrations deep into Cambodia, in order to increase its influence.

    An RTAF F-5E from the 102nd Squadron/1st Wing of Korat is seen returning from a patrol along the Cambodian border in 1987. The Thai F-5Es were engaged in both escort and ground attack missions. (Albert Grandolini collection)

    In addition, antagonizing Thailand proved not to be the best idea: in late May 1985 the Thai Marines were sent to attack Vietnamese troops dug-in along the southern part of the mutual border. This limited offensive was supported by the RTAF, which hit the Vietnamese hard. Thai fighter-bombers remained active in the following weeks and months, with F-5s and A-37s flying a large number of CAS sorties. The Vietnamese response was weak, then the Thais reported only eleven “attacks” of Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns or missiles. In fact, at the time the Vietnamese forces were overstretched. Hanoi was unable to support protracted offensives, and the Army could not operate offensively in several parts of Cambodia simultaneously. The SRVNAF was also facing considerable problems. The number of available Su-22M-3Ks – their only fighter-bombers capable of carrying heavier warloads – was always low, as some had to be held back for the defence of Vietnam, and some were always in maintenance, while the MiG-21s proved poor in COIN warfare. Consequently, they lacked firepower and started adapting C-130 and An-26 transport aircraft as bombers.

    In an attempt to prevent the guerrilla from reaching deeper into Cambodia, from the mid-1980s the Vietnamese and the KPRAF reinforced especially the Military Region 4, in the north-western Cambodia, and even started undertaking preventive operations over the Thai border. By 1986, namely, the Khmer Rouge were so weakened by the Vietnamese attacks, that most of the Khmers took refuge in Thailand – in camps already overcrowded by their former opponents; the ANS and the KPNLF, however, became increasingly popular in Cambodia, as the population could still remember the times they ruled as those of (relative) peace and prosperity. Consequently, the Vietnamese concentrated some 45.000 troops – including their elite units, like E.117/Dak Kong (Special Action) brigade - in this region alone, and these were permanently engaged in intensive patrols.

    The Thais were not to sit still, however. By January 1987 the regime in Phnom Penh claimed that RTAF aircraft violated the Cambodian airspace no less but 33 times: this is a very good indication of how massive the Thai operations along the mutual border actually were – especially given the fact that the poor radar coverage of the Cambodian airspace likely failed to detect dozens of other sorties, then the Thai Uh-1s, L-19s, A-37s, and F-5s were flying almost permanent combat air patrols along the border! The troops on the ground knew very well what was going on and soon enough the first reports became known about the Vietnamese regular troops being frequently hit by RTAF F-5Es, dropping napalm. Most of such operations were unopposed by the SRVAF or the KPRAF, even if these operated Mi-8s, Mi-24s, and T-28s in the area. But, in the same month a RTAF L-19 was shot down inside Cambodia. In return, the Thais started supplying SA-7 MANPADs to Khmer and KPNLF, and only a month later also a Vietnamese Mi-8 was shot down near Phnom Priel. Nevertheless, due to the low intensity of Vietnamese and Cambodian air operations, most of the expensive MANPADS rotted in the humidity long before there was any opportunity for their use.


    Throughout the 1980s the SRVAF used mainly converted transports as bombers. Helicopter gunships - such as this Mi-8 - also saw extensive use for ground support. Fighter-bombers were brought in from Vietnam only during the annual dry season offensives. This SRVAF Mi-8 from the 917th Regiment is seen during preparations for another combat sortie. (A. Grandolini collection)
    The Vietnamese meanwhile decided to change their tactics and start engaging Thais in a conventional war. Having cleared the border area of guerrilla camps they decided to take and hold portions of Thai territory, in order to deny guerrilla infiltrations. By January 1988 they therefore occupied the Chong Bok mountain pass, south of Ubon. The RTAF F-5s were sent to bomb the place several times and in April supported a Thai Army counteroffensive. The areas was not brought back under the control of Bang Kong, however, before another counterattack, staged by Thai special forces, which took the place only after it was heavily pounded by RTAF F-5s.
    Hidden Content Hidden Content
    Ung dung ngắm rước hoa có một con mèo béo
    Ngân nga mấy khúc ca có một con chuột gầy

    ...

  8. The Following 2 Users Say Thank You to btlinh For This Useful Post:

    dhhais (11-03-2010),MÃI MÃI (11-03-2010)

  9. #8
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    The situation was not improving, however, and finally much more massive retaliation was needed: in 1981 there were rumours about the Vietnamese using a number of An-2s to spray chemical weapons on Khmer concentrations.
    nhà mình mạnh tay ghê hè, không biết có phải chất da cam không nữa . Đọc sơ thì thấy nhà mình hồi đó đánh mạnh khiếp . Giờ mới hiểu sao Thái lại sợ mình đến thế.
    Bao giờ vơi những tàn phai
    Để ta tìm lại chiếc hài ngày xưa

  10. #9
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    @btlinh: còn tiếp không bác, hay chỉ có vậy thôi?

    Nghĩ chắc cái này là nguồn của Thái hay do người nước ngoài nhưng từ phía Thái quá, thấy viết tránh sự kiện với khá thiên vị
    "Có một sai lầm cực lớn trong cả chính trị lẫn tôn giáo. Đó chính là trong khi cố gắng thuyết phục người khác bạn cũng đã vô tình thuyết phục bản thân."
    "Tôi thà quên đi quá khứ để nhìn rõ hiện tại, tương lai, còn hơn là mù quáng tương lai để cố níu kéo những thứ vốn đã không còn tồn tại"
    "Quen thuộc với lí thuyêt là cần thiết vì thực tế không thể tự diễn giải"
    Hidden Content

  11. #10
    Tham gia ngày
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    ở đâu có bé, ở đó có anh.
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    không thấy đưa ra số thương vong ngoài 4 con máy bay bị bắn rơi, cũng ko thấy nhắc đến sư Thái nào bị múc.
    Bao giờ vơi những tàn phai
    Để ta tìm lại chiếc hài ngày xưa

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